

Dynamic Field Theory: autonomy

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Sequences

- all actioning and thinking consist of sequences of movements, perceptual states, and inferences
- sometimes in a fixed order (routines, action patterns)
- but potentially highly flexible: serial order, productivity...

Challenge

- DFT postulates that all neural states driving behavior/mental process are attractors
- that resist change...
- sequences require change...
- answer: induce an instability to access new attractor

Sequence generation

- an illustrative example
- the neural/mathematical mechanism

Illustration

■ search for objects of a given color in a given order


■ 1 blue

■ 2 red

■ green

■ stably couple to objects once they are detected


■ ignore objects when their turn has not yet come (distractors)



Implementation as an imitation task


- learn a serially ordered sequence from a single demonstration

yellow-red-green-blue-red




- perform the serially ordered sequence with new timing


yellow-red-green-blue-red



red a distractor




red a target



[Sandamirskaya, Schöner: *Neural Networks* 23:1 | 63 (2010)]

Condition of Satisfaction (CoS)




[Sandamirskaya, Schöner: *Neural Networks* 23:1163 (2010)]

Visual search

Camera image




- 2D visual input color vs. horizontal space
- intensity of input from a color histogram within each horizontal location




Visual search


- current color searched provides ridge input into a color-space field




Color-space DF




space,x
Camera image




Intention DF




CoS DF




Perception for CoS




ordinal stack




condition of satisfaction (CoS)





intentional state




2D color-space field








Mathematical mechanism




Sequence of instabilities

- the CoS is pre-shaped by the intention field, but is in the sub-threshold state
- until a matching input pushes the CoS field through the detection instability
- the CoS field inhibits the intention field that goes through a reverse detection instability
- the removal of input from the intention to the CoS field induce a reverse detection instability
- both fields are sub-threshold



Generalization

- match-detection => CoS
- mis-match (or change) detection => CoD (condition of dissatisfaction)




How is the next state selected?



- once the current state has been de-activated...
- three notions
 - gradient-based selection
 - chaining
 - positional representation
- an illustration

How is the next state selected?

- once the current state has been deactivated...
- 3 notions (~Henson Burgess 1997)




- 1 gradient-based selection
- 2 chaining
- 3 positional representation




Gradient-based

- a field/set of nodes is released from inhibition once the current state is deactivated...
- a new peak/node wins the selective competition based on inputs...
 - e.g. saliency map for visual search
 - e.g. overlapping input from multiple fields..
- return to previous states avoided by inhibition of return




Gradient-based

- this is used in many of the DFT architectures
 - visual search
 - relational grounding
 - mental mapping




Chaining


- for fixed sequences...
 - e.g. reach-grasp
 - fixed order of mental operations... e.g. ground reference object first, then target object
- less flexible (e.g.. when going through the same state with different futures)
- could be thought to emerge with practice/habit from the positional system



Positional representation

- a neural representation of ordinal position is organized to be sequentially activated...
- the contents at each ordinal position is determined by neural projections from each ordinal node...









Positional representation

- essentially chaining with flexible contents
- good for fast learning of sequences...
 - e.g. imitation
 - a Hippocampus function?
- but: must have potential synaptic links to many representations...
- => such ordinal systems must exist for sub-representations... embodiment effects...

Serial order demonstrated/enacted



[Tekülve et al.,
Frontiers in
Neurorobotics
(2019)]






FIGURE 5 | Time course of learning a three element sequence with varying presentation time.

Time course of attention selection and building of scene memory




FIGURE 4 | Time course of building a scene memory.





FIGURE 6 | Time course of recalling a three element sequence through pointing at colored objects.

online
updating



How far does such autonomy take us?

- the concept of *intentionality* to guide the building of an embodied cognitive architecture
- two directions of fit and the CoS
- an illustration

How does the mind emerge from neural processes?

- What do I mean by “mind”?
- *Intentionality* = the capacity of nervous systems to generate mental states that are *about things in the world*
 - *things* may include an organism’s own body
 - *things* may include the nervous system’s own states

Two *directions of fit* of intentional states (according to John Searle)

- *world-to-mind*: the world must match the intentional state to fulfill that state's *condition-of-satisfaction* (CoS)

- => the motor flavor of intentionality

- *mind-to-world*: the intentional state must match the state of the world to fulfill the CoS

- => the perceptual flavor of intentionality

From the logical definition of intentionality to neural processes

■ *CoS of world-to-mind* (motor) intentionality

- control the sequential unfolding of actions
- intention critical to initiate actions
- CoS is critical to terminate action intentions

■ *CoS of mind-to-world* (perceptual) intentionality

- the intentional state itself must match the state of the world => is its own CoS... arises with the intentional state
- the match is a property of the process
- possibility of error (e.g. mis-perception)

Searle's six *psychological modes*

■ *mind-to-world*

■ *perception*

■ *memory*

■ *belief*

■ *world-to-mind*

■ *intention-in-action*

■ *prior intention*


■ *desire*

■ as a heuristic for building cognitive architectures ...

■ that reflect the sensory-motor basis of cognition



Illustration: a neural dynamic intentional agent in a simple world



Scenario: intentional agent in simple world

■ world

■ colored objects (small)

■ paint buckets (tall)

■ vehicle with arm

■ perception

■ see color/height feature


■ sense position, arm, paint in gripper

■ intention in action

■ move in 1D

■ reach to take up paint

■ reach to apply a coat of paint



Scenario: intentional agent in simple world

■ memory

■ of the scene (feature maps)

■ prior intentions


■ search to paint

■ search to load paint

■ reach to apply paint

■ move to a recalled location

...




Scenario: intentional agent in simple world

■ beliefs


- rules that link color concepts: which paint on which canvas generates which outcome color


■ desires

- for particular colors



Neural dynamic architecture







Prior Intention

Intention-in-Action (liA)



Sensor/Motor Surface

Intention in action: reach







Memory




Perception




Sensor/Motor S

Perception and memory




[Grieben et al., AP&P, 2020]




Belief






Desire



Prior Intention



Full Empty



Intentional systems


■ => special lecture Jan Tekülve on Friday

What does it all mean...

- why do neural dynamic architectures work?
- how do embodied (neural dynamic) architectures relate to classical cognitive architectures ?
- what does embodiment mean?
- how does DFT relate to deep NN, to VSA?

DFT architectures


- why are attractors and their instabilities preserved as fields are coupled into architectures?
- stability \Rightarrow structural stability = invariance of solutions under change of the dynamics
- \Rightarrow **dynamic modularity**: fields retain their dynamic regime as activation elsewhere varies



DFT architectures

- why do fields retain their meaning...
- coupling among fields must preserve the fields' dimensions: "non-synesthesia principle"
- informational modularity (encapsulation)

■ => neural dynamic architectures are specific = constrained by evolution and development



What does “embodiment” mean?

- cognition activates motor systems?
- cognition is based on sensor systems?
- not necessarily!



What does “embodiment” mean?

- continuous state, continuous time
- continuous/intermittent link to the sensory and motor surfaces is *possible*
- closed loop => stability!



Embodiment hypothesis


- all cognitive processes inherit the dynamic properties of sensory-motor cognition: stability, instabilities...
- cognition is embedded in the specific embodied cognitive architectures that emerged in evolution/development



How is higher cognition reached?

- attentional selection,
coordinate transformation,
sequential processing ...
emulates “function calls”


to the left of = $f(\text{target}, \text{reference})$



- ... not as flexible as symbol manipulation and costly in processing structure ...
- but all concepts are grounded by their very nature...

Localist vs. distributed

- DFT hypothesis: all autonomous cognition happens in localist representations which are necessarily low-dimensional
- they don't have to be easy to grasp and observe
- they could be latent representations
- high-dimensional distributed representations subserve primarily classification, which is embedded in the neural dynamics of competing nodes



DFT vs VSA

- Vector-symbolic architectures (VSA) are a theoretical alternative
- in the original version (Smolensky): role-filler binding... compatible with DFT
- in the Gayler/Kanerva/Plate version: high-dimensional vectors as symbols that afford binding, and function calling ... not neurally feasible: autonomy
- requires that the symbol grounding problem is solved at encoding/decoding

DFT vs VSA

- Eliasmith's Neural Engineering Framework (NEF) as a possible neural implementation of VSA
 - vectors represented by (small) populations of spiking neural networks
- NEF is “model neutral”... essentially a method to “numerically” implement any neural model
- But: to preserve the original vectors, connectivity in VSA/NEF (SPAUN) architectures is very special => non-local dependence of connectivities on each other...

Outlook/challenges

- sequences of relational concepts that interrelate, exchange arguments, have hierarchical structure
 - “the box to the right of the bottle that stands under the lamp”
- sequences of actions that are directed at goals, and have hierarchical structure
 - “open the box to get the screwdriver with which you remove the screw to take off the cover of the toaster...”
- goals and their dynamics, motivation...
 - emotions...